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BOOK REVIEW
HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER. By MYRES S.
McDOUGAL,* HAROLD D. LASSWELL,** & LUNG-CHU CHEN.***
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980. Pp. xxiv, 1016. $45.00.
Fred L. Morrisonf
McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen's Human Rights and World
Public Order is the latest application of the well-known World
Public Order approach to a specific segment of international law. 1
The choice of subject matter makes this one of the most successful
of these endeavors. Human rights law is one of the most rapidly
developing and changing fields in international legal studies. Many
of the developments and changes are clearly "law" by any definition and are enforceable in domestic and international tribunals.
These include such norms as the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Inter-American Convention. The
various human rights covenants are likewise law, in esse or in
posse, even by traditional standards of norm recognition. Beyond
these, however, is the vast authoritative legal structure for specialized deliberation on human rights issues. This structure is international constitutive law, even if the institutions involved have few, if
any, authoritative substantive rules to apply and sanctions to
invoke.
Because of the rapid development of international human
rights norms in the past decade, their description and elaboration
* Sterling Professor of Law, Emeritus, Yale Law School; Distinguished Visiting
Professor of Law, New York Law School.
** Ford Foundation Professor of Law and the Social Sciences, Emeritus, Yale
Law School (deceased).
*** Professor of Law, New York Law School.
f Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. A.B., 1961, Kansas; B.A. (Juris.),
1963, Oxford University; Ph.D., 1966, Princeton University; J.D., 1967, University of
Chicago.
1. Major works include M. McDOUGAL & ASSOCIATES, STUDIES IN WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER (1960); M. McDoUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE
OCEANS (1962); M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAw AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1961); and M. McDoUGAL, H. LASSWELL & J. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1967).
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as a dynamic, not static, legal process is necessary for a comprehensive understanding of the subject matter. The more traditional
legal approaches have failed to provide an adequate description of
the current legal order as it pertains to human rights, let alone a
prescription or guidance for its juridical development. Indeed, the
McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen volume includes a comprehensive
survey of the failures of the major efforts in this direction, aptly entitled "Inadequacies in Inquiry: The Intellectual Confusion about
Human Rights." 2 The problem with most of the traditional forms of
analysis is that they provide a static picture of the state of human
rights law, a "snapshot" of currently applicable norms and practices. McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen offer a "motion picture,"
which emphasizes the evolving, ever-changing demands and expectations within this highly volatile field. A motion picture is a much
more accurate and useful perspective from which to view the state
of the law-both for the government practitioner attempting to
gauge the legality of proposed action and the human rights activist
attempting to advance the frontiers of human dignity.
That a picture is moving, however, is not a guarantee that it
reflects current reality. The dynamics of the system described by
the authors are such that any depiction of it is immediately obsolete, for the system changes faster than the printing press can produce the volume. Automatic obsolescence, however, does not detract from this volume's usefulness as a treatise on the process of
legal development. Armed with the insight proffered by the authors, one can look at later manifestations of existing legal questions, and use their methodology to predict trends and patterns.
The volume applies the well-developed apparatus of the
McDougal/Lasswell-public order analysis to human rights issues. It
opens with an extensive section on the delimitation of the human
3
rights question in the contemporary international legal system. It
continues with an effort to clarify and identify the general policies
involved, 4 and proceeds to point out trends, 5 and predict future
developments. 6 The volume also contains a brief appendix on the
7
law of nationality and the protection of human rights.
2. M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER 63-82 (1980).

3. Id. part I.
4. Id. part II.
5. Id. part III.
6. Id. part IV.
7. Id. appendix.
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The structure of the analysis requires systematic consideration
of various factors: Participants, perspectives, situations or arenas,
base values, strategies, outcomes, and effects. 8 Regarding nearly all
of these factors, the human rights movement has shaken many of
the traditional foundations of international law by expanding the forum and the rules of play. With the emergence of nongovernmental organizations as participants in international decisionmaking,
old doctrines that limited the "subjects" of international law to
nation-states are clearly obsolete. The perspectives include a rising
concern within nations for the protection of minimal human rights
in other nations-a phenomenon little known only a few decades
ago. The situations or arenas include the rapidly expanding list of
international organizations concerned with human rights. Here the
authors include not only the new treaty organizations, but also,
perhaps more significantly, other international organizations that
have taken up human rights issues ancillary to their primary substantive concerns. The panoply of human rights organizations ancillary to the United Nations is one example. While some have nominal decisional capacity, even those that do not still influence
international decisionmaking. The changes in base values, the
growing importance of the global-as opposed to the nationalcommunity, at least from the Western perspective, is a significant
change for decisionmakers. New strategies have also arisen. In addition to traditional diplomatic representations and national action,
the activities of official and unofficial international organizations can
shape outcomes and effects. Of course, the end product of the
McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen analysis is an examination of potential outcomes (regarding the concrete situation under consideration)
and the effects of possible outcomes upon the climate of future
decisionmaking.
In their effort to be comprehensive, the authors may have detracted from the usefulness of this book as a teaching and research
tool. The volume is at once both too detailed and too general. In
many instances, its analytic structure is filled out by long lists of
items to be considered by the reader in reaching conclusions about
the factor then under examination.9 These items, however, are

8. Id. ch. 2.
9. For example, a section on "rising common demands" includes a 7-page list
of human rights demands, id. at 7-13, and is followed by a 24-page list of deprivations. Id. at 15-37. The list of deprivations is extensively footnoted to source
material-mostly from the early and mid 1970's-relating to the particular issues.
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listed with only minimal narrative connection or analysis. This format may be jarring to the casual reader; the factors surge on without discussion of their weight or salience, or the impact of each
on decisionmaking. Of course, this can be instructive, for it emphasizes the lack of authoritative finality in the international legal
process.
The analyses of particular trends and conditioning factors may
be disappointing to specialized international scholars in the field.
The authors have selected nine human rights issues for analysis-all relating to what they classify as a single kind of claim: the
claim to respect. 10 It is impossible to develop a complete analysis
of any one of them in the available space. While the material presented is useful to illustrate the World Order-process method, it is
too brief to provide a comprehensive guide to the particular subject matter.
Like its predecessors, the volume may rekindle the controversy about the nature of international law. Is international law a
series of statements about a static set of acknowledged norms or is
it a description of a process, that is, the evolution of enforceable
expectations about governmental conduct?
Traditional legal scholarship of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries adhered to the first of these two approaches. It sought
stability in widely accepted norms, and eschewed the existence of
law when there were no firmly established legal expectations. The
epitome of this approach can be found in the provisions of the statutes of the two international courts, which narrowly define international law sources to be applied in controversies before them.' 1 A
narrow view of international law was reinforced by the positivism
which shaped much of this century's English jurisprudence, and
which is inherent in much of continental legal thought. Where a
putative norm had not been validated by the cumbersome processes of the Grundnorm of the system, it was mere political rhetoric and was beneath legal cognizance.
10. The chapters in this part of the volume relate to freedom of choice, basic
equality of opportunity, racial discrimination, sex discrimination, freedom of religion,
freedom of political opinion, language rights, aliens' rights, and rights of the aged.
Id. part III. In an average span of 35 pages, it is impossible to provide a comprehensive look at any of these subjects. The volume provides an introduction, not a
conclusion, to these studies.
11. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1) (1945), reprinted in
[1977] U.N.Y.B. app. 2 at 1190, 1193; Statute of the Permanent Court of International
Justice art. 38 (1920), reprintedin [1920-1927] LEAGUE OF NATIONS Y.B. 261, 271.
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Positivism was essential in freeing domestic law from the political whims of the sovereign in nineteenth century monarchiesespecially on the Continent-but it played havoc with any system
of international obligation. The difficulty of the positivist approach
is illustrated by Hans Kelsen's tortuous efforts to find a basis for
calling "international law". "law" within his narrow concept of legal
12
norms and obligations.
In contrast, process-oriented legal scholarship, of which
McDougal and Lasswell were the progenitors, has focused on the
constantly evolving nature of international law. The late Harold
Lasswell's sociological approach to domestic legal questions was applied and sharpened in the international field in a long association
with Myres McDougal;13 it has been applied in collaboration with a
series of scholars. It is no accident that this approach blossomed in
the United States both because of the emergence of "legal realism"
and "sociological jurisprudence" and because of the nature of
American legal interpretation. The American lawyer was better
prepared than his Commonwealth or Continental compatriots to accommodate the dynamics of change in law through progressive interpretation and evolution, rather than through formal amendment.
14
Unburdened with the stare decisis of the House of Lords
and the limitations of code interpretation, and blessed with a multiplicity of domestic jurisdictions, American law has been a more
creative exercise. In private obligations, the American common law
system permitted a gradual evolution of legal norms. In public law,
the broad strokes of the United States Constitution accustomed the
American lawyer to radical changes in legal norms, even to complete reversals, without so much as the change of a single comma
in the governing document. Since this approach to the law is alien
to many foreign lawyers, it has not been accepted in all areas with
open arms.
Indeed, in some fields of international law, the more traditional view has gained ascendancy. Where a high degree of legal
certainty is required to guide decisionmakers in their present decisions about the future consequences of their conduct and promises,
12.

H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 328-90 (A. Wedberg

trans. 1961). Despite the strictures of his general jurisprudential approach, Professor
Kelsen was a major exponent of international law.
13. See McDougal & Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse

Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1959).
14.

Even after the formal abandonment of stare decisis, much of the English

approach is remarkably oriented toward formal precedent.
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the relative stability of traditional analysis has proven attractive.
Thus, the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties appears to
have rejected much of the contextual analysis promoted by Professor McDougal in favor of a more rigid textual analysis 15 Perhaps
this is parallel to the ascendancy of textualism in some fields of domestic law, such as taxation, in which a high degree of certainty
about future consequences is required.
In other areas, traditional scholarship has failed to provide an
accurate account of legal prescriptions. Human rights is clearly an
area in which process-oriented scholars are entitled to claim the
day. Here there is broad acknowledgment of the rapid change in
normative standards. This is occurring both within traditional channels of international-norm recognition (e.g., by new treaty law) and
outside those channels by the development of new expectations regarding state conduct. Yesterday's clear legal precedent is today's
questionable authority and tomorrow's antiquarian curiosity.
Nothing makes the preeminence of process-oriented scholarship in human rights law clearer than an examination of traditional
analyses in this field. Only a decade ago, major traditional international law treatises and texts appeared with only the merest mention of human rights.' 6 There was little or no indication of the ferment in the international legal system which would push human
rights to the fore as a topic for juridical examination. During the
last decade, there has been a blossoming of scholarship concerned
with the application of existing and newly emergent international
legal rules in human rights situations: Decisions of domestic courts,
international regional adjudication, the deliberations of universal
agencies under United Nations auspices, and the emergence of human rights issues in the broader security picture.
In this context, traditional analysis can tell the scholar or
reader only what yesterday's rules were. It is here that the World
Order-process analysis permits the scholar to recognize not only
presently applicable rules, but trends and developments that predict the norms that will apply in the future. These are the elements that an expert lawyer needs: An ability to focus on develop15. For a discussion of the progress of those negotiations and the rejection of
Professor McDougal's suggestions, see Kearney & Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64
AM. J. INT'L L. 495, 519-21 (1970).
16. E.g., W. FRIEDMANN, 0. LISSITZYN & E. PUGH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAv (1969) devoted only 11 of its 1,205 pages to human rights issues.
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ment and a prescription to guide conduct both for today and for
the future when the dynamics of the system may make a different
set of technical rules apply. For example, today's international lawyer would be unwise to rely upon the domestic-jurisdiction rule to
justify or excuse a state's mistreatment of its own citizens, even
though that was a widely held doctrine a decade ago. Lawyers
must come to recognize that evolution controls legal decisionmaking
internationally as well as internally.
This is the McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen volume's prime
contribution. It does not and cannot provide a complete description of international human rights law. Its contribution on the substance of any particular issue (e.g., age discrimination) is too limited to provide the ultimate research tool or the definitive
statement. The volume is already dated in this regard, as the dynamics of the system it describes overtake it. But rather than providing answers to specific questions, the volume provides a more
important service: A comprehensive overview of the process within
which and the influences under which human rights law is rapidly
emerging. While the book will be of continuing value as a source
for discussion of legal process, its particular window in time on the
state of international legal norms and surrounding factual considerations will become rapidly obsolete. However, the ultimate purpose of legal scholarship is not merely to describe, but to guide the
progressive development of law.
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